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What drives banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs? An ARDL approach 
Azarahiah Lokman1 and Mansur Masih* 
 
ABSTRACT 
SMEs have been recognized as an important engine for driving economic growth and job 
creation both in developed and developing countries.  However, there is concern that 
financial constraint is impeding growth in these SMEs.  Bank is a major source of SME 
financing in most countries. In Malaysia, banks provide 90% of total financing to SMEs 
(SME Annual Report, 2014/15).  Focusing on three aspects; the macroeconomic 
environment, demand for large enterprise loans and property prices, this study aims to find 
out the effect of these factors on banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs and which of these 
three is most influential.  Using ARDL approach applied to Malaysian quarterly data for 
the period from 2003Q2 to 2015Q4, the study finds macroeconomic environment 
significantly influences banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs.  Thus, policy makers have a 
tall order of creating and maintaining a healthy macroeconomic environment in an attempt 
to improve banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs.  The finding that property prices also play 
a role in influencing banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs appears to suggest banks’ 
dependency on property as collateral for SME financing.  Thus, policy makers should 
continue to develop and improve SME financing schemes that encourages banks’ 
participation in financing SMEs with potential but lacks collateral.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of many developed economies 
such as Japan, Germany and South Korea. Many developing economies including Malaysia 
have recognized SMEs as an engine for economic growth and development. SMEs in 
Malaysia contribute 35.9% of gross domestic product (GDP) and provide job opportunities 
to more than six million workers or 65% of total employment (SME Annual Report, 
2014/15). Due to this, many initiatives have been directed towards developing these SMEs. 
One important area in SME development is access to financing. Due to the nature of the 
SMEs, banking institutions remain the major provider of financing in many countries. In 
Malaysia, banking institutions provides 90% of total financing to SMEs (SME Annual 
Report, 2014/15). Following a seminal study by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988 on 
financial constraints and corporate investments, a body of literature has emerged to 
estimate financial constraints of firms including SMEs.  Many empirical studies have 
focused on the issues and factors related to the availability of credit to these SMEs (see for 
example, Ayyagari et al, 2016, Udell, 2015, Beck et al, 2008, Ackert et al, 2007, Berger et 
al 2006 and Berger et al 2005). Why is it so important? It is important due to the fact that 
SMEs are smaller and private in nature as compared to large enterprises. Large enterprises 
have more options to fund their business operations in contrast to SMEs, which mainly 
depend on banks for financing. 
Figure 1: SME loans as a percentage of total loans for selected commercial banks in 
Malaysia (as at Dec 15)  
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Source: Company Reports (as cited in CIMB Research, 2016) 
 
One of the concerns on access to finance for SMEs is its susceptibility to the 
macroeconomic environment.  In examining the economics of financing small business in 
private equity and debt markets, Berger and Udell, 1998, argue the flow of funds to small 
business in private equity and debt markets is likely to depend on fluctuations in the 
macroeconomic environment, such as shocks to the real or financial sectors or changes in 
government policy. They further argue because of its informational opacity, small business 
is more likely to bear a disproportionate share of the loss of funding that occurs when there 
is a market failure.  In an empirical study using survey data, Berg and Fuchs, 2013, find 
macroeconomic factors are indeed the most significant obstacle to SME lending identified 
by banks in all the five Sub Saharan African countries.  This finding is also consistent with 
Beck et al, 2008, which also find macroeconomic factors the most significant obstacle for 
developing countries, using survey data from 91 banks and 45 countries. 
Nonetheless, does this mean in a conducive macroeconomic environment banks have no 
qualms in financing SMEs?  Banks often perceive SMEs as riskier (compared to large 
enterprises) due to information asymmetry problem. Many SMEs especially the smaller 
ones do not have audited accounts and their business dealings are often kept in private 
unlike large firms. This has made risk assessment more difficult from the lender’s point of 
view.  Thus, banks have quite often use collateral to mitigate some of the risks associated 
with SME financing.  This is not surprising as collateral has been regarded as an efficient 
solution to information asymmetry problem (see Bester, 1987 or Chan and Kanatas, 1985).  
In fact, using World Business Environment Survey (WBES) to examine financing 
obstacles, Beck et al, 2006, find collateral requirement as the third most important 
obstacles.  Due to the possible impact on availability of financing for SMEs, there is a 
23.4%
22.0% 21.6%
16.2% 15.4% 15.4% 14.9% 14.3%
2.7%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
PBB Alliance Affin Maybank HLB CIMB RHB AMMB BIMB
 4 
strand of literature studying various aspects of collateral and SME financing (see for 
example Hanedar et al, 2014, Berger et al, 2011 and Voordeckers & Steijvers, 2006).    
On the other hand, are banks shying away from SMEs?  Not at all.  From a market 
considered too difficult to serve, SMEs has now become a strategic target of banks 
worldwide (IFC, 2010). Competition in other markets is often cited by commercial banks 
moving “downstream” to serve SMEs (IFC, 2010).  Using a survey data from 91 banks in 
45 countries, Beck et al, 2008, find banks actually perceive the SME segment to be very 
profitable and some banks indicate thinning margins in other segments as one of the driving 
factors of their involvement with SMEs. 
In reality, there are many factors associated with banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs.  
Berger et al, 2006, provide an extension to the conceptual SME financing framework which 
covers among others, the financial institutions structures, the lending infrastructures of 
nations and the lending technologies used by banks for SME financing.  Berger and Udell, 
1998 discuss SME specific factors such as the inherent information opacity problem and 
size as well as their vulnerability to the macroeconomic environment in relation to SME 
finance.   
Whilst this study does not intend to comprehensively analyse all the drivers, it attempts to 
study three important aspects of SME financing from the supply side perspective.  
Specifically, it focuses on the impact of the macroeconomic environment, demand from 
large enterprise loans and property prices on banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs in 
Malaysia.  Though studies have shown macroeconomic environment as a main obstacle 
impeding growth in SME financing, these studies utilize survey data.  The current study 
uses time series data to find out if macroeconomic environment is indeed a major factor in 
driving banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs.  Most studies related to SME lending focuses 
on specific issue such as collateral.  To the best of author’s knowledge, there is no study 
that compares the relative importance of these three driving factors.  Thus, this study 
intends to contribute to the literature by empirically finding out which of these factors are 
most influential on banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs. 
In the following section, the definition and profile of SMEs in Malaysia is introduced.  
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Thereafter, the theoretical underpinnings in relation to the research questions are discussed.  
Subsequently, the methodology employed is explained.  Next, the data utilized is described 
and results discussed.  The paper ends with some concluding remarks and limitations to 
research.     
 
II. DEFINITION AND PROFILE OF SMEs IN MALAYSIA 
The definition of SMEs vary from country to country and even from bank to bank though 
commonly defined as registered businesses with less than 250 employees (IFC, 2009).  Due 
to many developments in the economy, Malaysia has revised its SME definition in 2013 as 
follows; a business will be deemed as an SME if it meets either one of the two specified 
qualifying criteria, namely sales turnover or full-time employees, whichever is lower (SME 
Corp, 2013).  The definition is simplified as follows: 
RM50 million OR full-time 
employees not exceeding 200 workers  
Services and other sectors: Sales turnover not exceeding RM20 million OR 
full-time employees not exceeding 75 workers  
Table 1: Definition by size of operation 
Category Small Medium 
Manufacturing Sales turnover from 
RM300,000 to less than 
RM15 million OR full-time 
employees from 5 to less 
than 75 
Sales turnover from RM15 
million to not exceeding RM50 
million OR full-time 
employees from 75 to not 
exceeding 200 
Services & Other 
Sectors 
Sales turnover from 
RM300,000 to less than 
RM3 million OR full-time 
employees from 5 to less 
than 30 
Sales turnover from RM3 
million to not exceeding RM20 
million OR full-time 
employees from 30 to not 
exceeding 75 
*firms with sales below RM300,000 OR employees less than 5 are deemed 
microenterprises 
Source: SME Corp, 2013 
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As a result of the change in definition, the share of SMEs to total establishments has 
increased from 97.3% to 98.5% based on the Economic Census 2011 - Profile of Small and 
Medium Enterprise (BNM, 2013).   Most of the SMEs are microenterprises, forming 77% 
of total SMEs in Malaysia in 2010. Small-sized SMEs accounted for 20%, while medium-
sized SMEs constitute the balance 3% (refer to Table 2 and Figure 2).   
Microenterprises are predominant in the services sector, accounting for close to 80% of 
SMEs in the sector. Construction and Mining & Quarrying sectors have a relatively higher 
percentage of medium enterprises indicating bigger players in the segments.   
Table 2: Profile of SMEs 
Sector Total 
Establishments 
(a) 
Total 
SMEs* (b) 
Percentage (%) of SMEs over 
Total Establishments 
(b)/(a)*100 
Overall Total    662,939  645,136  97.3  
Services 591,883  580,985  98.1  
Manufacturing 39,669  37,861  95.4  
Agriculture 8,829  6,708  76.0  
Construction 22,140  19,283  87.1  
Mining & Quarrying 418  299  71.5  
*includes microenterprises 
Source: Department of Statistics (2011) 
Figure 2: Distribution of SMEs by Size and Sector 
 
Source: Department of Statistics (2011) 
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III.  THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
This section reviews the related literature and discusses the theoretical underpinnings with 
regards to the research questions.  Berger and Udell, 1998, analyses the vulnerability of 
small firm finance to the macroeconomic environment. Some of the issues include the 
fragility of private equity markets and their strong reactions to current events in public 
equity markets; the effects of monetary policy shifts; bank credit crunches caused by 
regulatory changes, macroeconomic conditions, or capital problems in the banking 
industry; credit rationing over the interest rate and credit risk cycles; and the continuing 
effects of the consolidation of financial institutions (Berger & Udell, 1998).   Many 
empirical studies have indeed found macroeconomic environment as one of the major 
obstacles impeding growth in SME segment by banks (See for example, Berg & Fuchs, 
2013 and Beck et al, 2008).  Nonetheless, whilst these studies utilize survey data, using 
time series data, this current study aims to find out the influence of macroeconomic 
environment on banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs. 
One inherent problem with SMEs is information asymmetry.  Many SMEs especially the 
smaller ones do not have audited accounts and their business dealings are often kept in 
private unlike large firms.  This has made risk assessment more difficult from the lender’s 
point of view.  Therefore, lenders have used various tools at the beginning of the 
relationship to mitigate their risk in SME lending.  One way is the requirement for 
collateral.  In analysing the structure of credit market equilibrium under imperfect 
information, Bester, 1987, shows lenders may use collateral as a self-selection and 
incentive mechanism.  Rationing occurs if borrowers’ collateralization wealth is too small 
to allow perfect sorting or to create sufficiently strong incentives (Bester, 1987).  If this is 
so, we would expect bank’s willingness to lend to SMEs to move with property prices.  
Higher property prices would give more room for banks to lend more.  Thus, this study 
attempts to examine the influence of property prices on banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs.     
Unlike SMEs which has fewer options for external financing and mainly dependent on 
bank financing, large enterprises have greater options.  In addition to bank lending, they 
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are also able to source financing through capital market, private equity and others.  This 
makes the large enterprise segment more competitive.  Thus, according to this theory, 
banks’ willingness to lend would depend on the demand for large loans.  On the other hand, 
is it demand from large loans that is driving the demand for SME loans which subsequently 
drives banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs?  This is due to the fact that many SMEs support 
the business of large enterprises.  Thus, based on this theory, demand for large loans would 
drive the demand for SME loans and naturally drives banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs.      
In addition to the above, the study also intends to find out the relative importance of each 
factor discussed.  In other words, this study attempts to examine which of the three aspects 
is most influential on banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs. 
The next section discusses how the research questions are going to be addressed.    
 
IV.  METHODOLOGY 
This study employs ARDL or also known as bounds testing approach suggested by Pesaran 
et al, 2001 to carry out the cointegration analysis which is appropriate for the current data 
set utilized (as shown in the next section).  There are several advantages of using ARDL 
compared to other cointegration techniques.  It can be applied irrespective of whether the 
variables are stationary or non stationary and also has better small sample properties 
(Narayan & Smyth, 2005).   In addition, a simple linear transformation allows a dynamic 
error correction model (ECM) to be derived from ARDL (Banerjee et al, 1993). The ECM 
integrates the short-run dynamics with the long-run equilibrium without losing long-run 
information (Pesaran & Chin, 1999). 
Prior to applying ARDL, stationarity of variables is investigated.  Whilst the ARDL testing 
approach does not require unit root tests, it is crucial to do so to ensure no variable is 
integrated at order two or higher.  This is a precondition for ARDL to be carried out as it 
assumes all variables are either I(0) or I(1).  Otherwise, the computed F-statistics generated 
by Pesaran et al, 2001 is invalid.  In this study, three unit root tests are carried out i.e. the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, the Phillip Perron (PP) test and KPSS test.   
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There are two stages involved in ARDL.  The first stage involves investigating the 
existence of the long run relationship between the variables by computing the F-statistic to 
test the significance of the lagged levels of the variables in the error correction form of the 
underlying ARDL model.  Pesaran et al, 2001, present two sets of asymptotic critical values 
for testing cointegration for a given significance level.  The set with lower value is 
computed assuming that the regressors are I(0) and the other set with upper value is 
computed assuming that the regressors are I(1).  If the computed F statistics exceeds the 
upper critical value, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected. If it falls below 
the lower critical value the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Finally, if the F statistics 
value falls between the lower and upper critical values the result is inconclusive. 
The second stage is pursued only if the first stage is satisfied i.e. that there is long run 
relationship between the variables.  The second stage in this study involves estimating the 
long run model by selecting the orders of ARDL model using AIC and estimating an Error 
Correction Model (ECM) using the long run estimates. This enables the speed of 
adjustment of the dependent variable to independent variables to be estimated.  A value of 
zero indicates non-existence of long run relationships whilst a value of between -1 and 0 
indicates existence of partial adjustment.  A value smaller than -1 indicates the model over 
adjusts in the current period and a positive value indicates the system moves away from 
equilibrium in the long run.     
The next section describes the data that is utilized in this study and discusses the results. 
 
V.  DATA, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This study employs quarter time series data from 2003Q2-2015Q4.  All data are extracted 
from BNM Quarterly Bulletin, BNM Monthly Bulletin and IFS.  The period for the 
empirical analysis is dictated by data availability for bank lending to SMEs, which is on 
quarterly basis. The definition of the variables is tabulated in Table 3: 
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Table 3: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
SME loans approval rates (S) SME loans approvals / SME loans application to 
banks during the period (in RM) 
Large loan applications (D) Large loan applications during the period (in RM) 
Property Price (H) House Price Index 
Lending Rate (I) Average lending rate in the banking system 
Consumer Price Index (C) CPI 
Exchange Rate (X) Real Effective Exchange Rate based on CPI 
(2010=100) 
GDP (G) Real Gross Domestic Product, Index (2010=100) 
 
SME loans approval rates represent banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs as compared to 
demand.  Large loan applications represent the demand for large loans during the period.  
House Price Index is utilized instead of property price index due to data unavailability.  
Lending rate, CPI, exchange rate and GDP represent macroeconomic environment 
indicators.  All variables except lending rate are transformed into natural logs.       
Before applying the ARDL, we test the stationarity of all the variables to determine their 
order of integration using three unit root tests i.e. the ADF test, PP test and KPSS test.  The 
unit root test results are indicated in Table 4 below. 
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Table 4: Unit Root Test Results 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root test 
 Variables in Level Form Variables in Differenced Form 
 Test Statistic Critical Value Implication Test Statistic Critical Value Implication 
S -5.2673 -3.5112 Stationary -5.7212 -2.9287 Stationary 
D -3.5918 -3.5112 Stationary -6.3194 -2.9287 Stationary 
H -1.8646 -3.5136 Non 
Stationary 
-2.7297 -2.9303 Non 
Stationary 
I -2.1815 -3.5112 Non 
Stationary 
-3.3189 -2.9287 Stationary 
C -3.3222 -3.5112 Non 
Stationary 
-5.3201 -2.9287 Stationary 
X .052219 -3.5112 Non 
Stationary 
-3.2442 -2.9287 Stationary 
G -2.1599 -3.5112 Non 
Stationary 
-4.2698 -2.9287 Stationary 
Phillips-Perron Unit Root test 
 Variables in Level Form Variables in Differenced Form 
 Test Statistic Critical Value Implication Test Statistic Critical Value Implication 
S -6.7862      -3.5005 Stationary -17.2375 -2.9215 Stationary 
D -4.3182 -3.5005 Stationary -10.1740 -2.9215 Stationary 
H -3.1646 -3.5025 Non 
Stationary 
-10.0830 -2.9228 Stationary 
I -1.8726 -3.5005 Non 
Stationary 
-4.4659 -2.9215 Stationary 
C -2.6428 -3.5005 Non 
Stationary 
-6.3061 -2.9215 Stationary 
X -.41820 -3.5005 Non 
Stationary 
-5.6909 -2.9215 Stationary 
G -4.8077 -3.5005 Stationary -8.5926 -2.9215 Stationary 
KPSS Stationarity Test 
 Variables in Level Form Variables in Differenced Form 
 Test Statistic Critical Value Implication Test Statistic Critical Value Implication 
S .086183       .14043 Stationary .060627       .41138 Stationary 
D .10323       .14043 Stationary .057414       .41138 Stationary 
H .097775       .14043 Stationary .088353       .41138 Stationary 
I .099078       .14043 Stationary .081590       .41138 Stationary 
C .15522       .14043 Non 
Stationary 
.061748       .41138 Stationary 
X .15028       .14043 Non 
Stationary 
.25885       .41138 Stationary 
G .092699       .14043 Stationary .061883       .41138 Stationary 
 
The unit root tests indicate mixed results in terms of stationary and non stationary variables.  
This creates an appropriate environment for applying ARDL as explained in the earlier 
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section.  In other cointegration techniques, all variables are required to be non stationary 
in the level form but ARDL is able to be applied irrespective of whether the variables are 
stationary or non stationary in the level form.  In addition, ARDL is appropriate for our 
small sample size. 
 
Next we conduct the bounds test for the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  The results 
are depicted in Table 5.  The results indicates cointegration is present when average lending 
rate (I) is taken as the dependent variable evidenced by the F-statistics being higher than 
the upper bound of the critical value at 5% level.  This implies that there is long run 
relationship between banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs, demand for large loans, house 
price, average lending rate and macroeconomic environment. 
 
Table 5: Bounds Test Statistics For Cointegration 
F-Statistics  
F(LS | LD, LH, LI, LC, LX, LG) =  1.8630 
F(LD | LS, LH, LI, LC, LX, LG) =  0.64019 
F(LH | LS, LD, LI, LC, LX, LG) =  1.8254 
F(LI | LS, LD, LH, LC, LX, LG) =  5.1665(**) 
F(LC | LS, LD, LH, LI, LX, LG) =  1.5605 
F(LX | LS, LD, LH, LI, LC, LG) =  2.1886 
F(LG | LS, LD, LH, LI, LC, LX) =  2.5700 
Note: Bounds test statistics are compared with critical values tabulated in Pesaran et al. (2001, p. 300, p. 
303). The symbols (**) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level. 
 
Now that cointegration is proven, the next step involves estimating the coefficients from 
the selected ARDL specification to model the long run relationship.  The results are 
tabulated in Table 6.  The ARDL model selected by AIC is chosen due to better coefficient 
estimates and also because the model selected by SBC indicated problems in the diagnostic 
tests.   
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Table 6: Estimates of the long run coefficients based on ARDL (3,4,3,4,1,4,3) selected by 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
Dependent Variable: LS   
Variable Coefficient T-ratio 
LD .24672             4.0614[.001]* 
LH .054413             1.2800[.218] 
I .13918             5.1098[.000]* 
LC -1.4346              -1.1873[.251] 
LX -1.2497              -1.4827[.156] 
LG -.20384              -.39788[.696] 
INPT 15.3682              7.2747[.000]* 
   *significance at 1% level (p-value in parentheses) 
The error correction representation of the selected ARDL models is now estimated.  The 
results are indicated in Table 7.  The results indicate seven error correction models with 
SME loans approval rate, demand from large loans, property prices, lending rate, CPI, 
exchange rate and GDP as dependent variables.  The T-ratios are significant at 1% level 
for all dependent variables except for exchange rate, which is significant at 5% level and 
GDP, which is not significant.  This indicates GDP is an exogenous variable and the others 
endogenous.  This implies GDP is the leading variable whilst the others are followers.   
 
Table 7: Error Correction Representations for the selected ARDL models (based on AIC) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model Regressor Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T-ratio 
dLS ARDL(3,4,3,4,1,4,3) ecm(-1) -2.6501 .46871 -5.6541[.000]* 
dLD ARDL(3,4,3,3,4,0,1) ecm(-1) -.79539 .22578 -3.5229[.002]* 
dI ARDL(4,0,0,1,2,1,4) ecm(-1) -.20049 .049734 -4.0314[.000]* 
dLC ARDL(3,3,4,0,4,4,1) ecm(-1) -.71812 .097715 -7.3491[.000]* 
dLX ARDL(3,0,0,1,2,3,3) ecm(-1) -.53426 .19596 -
2.7264[.010]** 
dLG ARDL(4,0,4,1,4,4,1) ecm(-1) -.061780 .12426 -.49720[.623] 
   *significance at 1% level (p-value in parentheses)   **significance at 5% level (p-value in parentheses) 
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Whilst the error correction representations enable the identification of endogenous and 
exogenous variables, it is unable to determine relative endogeneity or exogeneity.  
However, Variance Decomposition (VDCs) enables the degree of exogeneity or 
endogeneity amongst the variables to be gauged beyond the sample period.  VDCs are also 
known as out-of-sample causality tests.  VDCs decompose the variance of forecast error of 
each variable into proportions attributable to shocks from each variable in the system, 
including its own. The variable that is mostly explained by its own shocks (and not by other 
variables) is deemed to be the most exogenous of all. 
There are two ways of conducting VDCs: orthogonalized and generalized VDCs.  In this 
current study, generalized VDCs are employed.  Whilst both types have their own strengths 
and weaknesses, this study uses generalized VDCs due to the following reasons.  There are 
two important limitations of orthogonalized VDCs.  One is that it assumes when a 
particular variable is shocked, all the other variables are switched off.  Another limitation 
is it does not generate a unique solution.  The numbers produced are dependent on the 
ordering of the variables in the VAR.  Thus, the first variable would report the highest 
percentage and most likely to be specified as the most exogenous variable.  On the other 
hand, generalized VDCs have a different problem of its own.  The generated numbers do 
not add up to 1.  Thus, to interpret the results, one needs to do additional computations to 
normalize the numbers.    
Table 8 indicates at the end of the forecast horizon period i.e. horizon 20, GDP is the most 
exogenous variable; it is able to explain 41% of its own variance.  This strengthens the 
earlier finding on the exogeneity of GDP.  The result also indicates exchange rates have 
impact on SME loan approval rates.  These findings validate the influence of 
macroeconomic environment on banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs.  
Property prices as well as demand from large loans are also relatively more exogenous than 
SME loans approval rates.  This may indicate SME loans approval rate to a certain extent 
is influenced by property prices.  This is because banks often require some collateral to be 
pledged for SME financing and property is one of the most common collaterals.  Thus, a 
booming property market would provide additional room for banks to approve higher / 
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more loans.  Table 9 provides change in relative endogeneity / exogeniety among the 
variables over time. 
 
Table 8: Variance Decompositions (VDCS) 
HORIZON 4 
(quarters) DS DD DH DI DC DX DG 
DS 56% 5% 6% 4% 19% 2% 8% 
DD 6% 40% 19% 6% 19% 6% 4% 
DH 3% 13% 46% 5% 15% 10% 6% 
DI 6% 1% 4% 52% 10% 15% 13% 
DC 11% 19% 8% 2% 41% 9% 11% 
DX 0% 2% 21% 10% 6% 47% 13% 
DG 7% 2% 6% 12% 24% 11% 38% 
 
HORIZON 8 
(quarters) DS DD DH DI DC DX DG 
DS 37% 7% 13% 7% 17% 11% 7% 
DD 6% 36% 19% 6% 17% 10% 6% 
DH 5% 16% 40% 7% 17% 9% 6% 
DI 4% 4% 8% 35% 7% 27% 15% 
DC 8% 16% 12% 5% 34% 13% 12% 
DX 1% 3% 18% 16% 6% 43% 13% 
DG 6% 8% 7% 9% 18% 14% 39% 
 
HORIZON 12 
(quarters) DS DD DH DI DC DX DG 
DS 34% 7% 14% 7% 16% 16% 7% 
DD 6% 37% 19% 6% 18% 9% 5% 
DH 5% 15% 39% 8% 17% 9% 6% 
DI 4% 5% 9% 33% 6% 26% 15% 
DC 9% 15% 14% 6% 31% 14% 11% 
DX 1% 4% 18% 16% 7% 41% 13% 
DG 6% 7% 7% 12% 15% 14% 39% 
 
HORIZON 16 
(quarters) DS DD DH DI DC DX DG 
DS 32% 8% 14% 7% 16% 16% 7% 
DD 6% 35% 19% 7% 17% 10% 7% 
DH 5% 15% 39% 8% 17% 11% 6% 
DI 4% 6% 11% 31% 6% 26% 16% 
 16 
DC 9% 15% 15% 6% 30% 14% 12% 
DX 1% 4% 19% 15% 7% 40% 14% 
DG 6% 7% 7% 12% 13% 15% 40% 
 
 
Table 8: Variance Decompositions (VDCs) continued 
HORIZON 20 
(quarters) DS DD DH DI DC DX DG 
DS 32% 8% 14% 7% 16% 16% 8% 
DD 6% 34% 19% 7% 17% 10% 7% 
DH 5% 15% 39% 8% 16% 11% 6% 
DI 4% 6% 11% 30% 6% 26% 16% 
DC 8% 15% 15% 6% 29% 14% 12% 
DX 2% 4% 18% 15% 7% 39% 14% 
DG 6% 6% 7% 11% 12% 16% 41% 
 
 
Table 9: Ranking of Relative Endogeneity / Exogeneity Among Variables Over Time 
HORIZON 
(quarters) DS DD DH DI DC DX DG 
4 1 6 4 2 5 3 7 
8 4 5 2 6 7 1 3 
12 5 4 2 6 7 1 3 
16 5 4 3 6 7 2 1 
20 5 4 3 6 7 2 1 
 
The findings from VDCs are further confirmed by Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) 
analysis.  IRFs can be seen as the visual version of VDCs.  Figure 3 to Figure 9 below 
indicates the exogeneity of GDP in graphical forms when shocked by each variable.  Figure 
10 and Figure 11 provides a clearer visual indicating exogeneity of GDP. 
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Figure 3: Variable – SME loans approval rate (DS) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Variable – Demand for large loans (DD) 
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Figure 5: Variable – Property price (DH) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Variable – Lending rate (DI) 
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Figure 7: Variable – CPI (DC) 
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Figure 8: Variable – Exchange rate (DX) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Variable – GDP (DG) 
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Figure 10: Variable – GDP (DG) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Variable – SME loans approval rate (DS) 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Access to financing for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) has been a subject of 
great interest both to policymakers and researchers because of the significance of SMEs in 
private sectors around the world and the perception that these firms are financially 
constrained (Beck et al, 2011).  SMEs especially the smaller ones find it difficult to obtain 
commercial bank financing, especially long-term loans, for a number of reasons, including 
lack of collateral, difficulties in proving creditworthiness, small cash flows, inadequate 
credit history, high risk premiums, underdeveloped bank-borrower relationships and high 
transaction costs (IFC, 2009).  Nevertheless, bank financing is a major source of SME 
financing in many countries.  In Malaysia, banks provide 90% of total SME financing 
(SME Annual Report, 2014/15).   
Thus, this study attempts to investigate what drives banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs. 
Specifically, the research focuses on evaluating the influence of macroeconomic 
environment, demand for large enterprise loans, and property prices on banks’ willingness 
to lend to SMEs.  The research also aims to find out which of these factors influence banks’ 
willingness to lend to SMEs most. 
Utilizing GDP, exchange rates, CPI and lending rates as indicators for macroeconomic 
variables, the study finds the former two as most influential on SME loans approval rate. 
This indicates macroeconomic environment greatly affects banks’ willingness to lend to 
SMEs.  In addition, the study finds property prices also influence SME loans approval 
rates.  This shows property prices do affect banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs to a certain 
extent.  
Thus, policy makers have a tall order of creating and maintaining a healthy macroeconomic 
environment in an attempt to improve banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs.  The finding 
that property prices also play a role in influencing banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs 
appears to suggest banks dependency on property as collateral for SME financing.  Thus, 
policy makers should continue to develop and improve SME financing schemes that 
encourage banks’ participation in financing SMEs with potential but lacks collateral.   
Malaysia, through various agencies, has been active in developing such financing 
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programs.  For example, Credit Enhancer Program which is partly guaranteed by the Credit 
Guarantee Corporation (CGC) and Working Capital Guarantee Scheme (WCGS) which is 
guaranteed by Syarikat Jaminan Pembiayaan Perniagaan Berhad (SJPP).  Whilst many 
government guarantee schemes are being offered, there is a need for continued assessment 
on the effectiveness of these schemes and improvise where necessary.  
Limitations of Research 
 
The study utilizes SME approval rate as a proxy for banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs.  
Whilst this is considered reasonable, there are other factors that may lead to the rejection 
of the application for financing by banks.  SME specific factors is also one of the major 
obstacles for banks in SME lending (Berg & Fuchs, 2013).    This includes SME financial 
performance, size, sector and others.  Bank specific factors also influence willingness to 
lend to SMEs.  Different bank has different risk appetite and bank size also may play a 
role.  In addition, there are many qualitative factors that influence banks’ willingness to 
lend to SMEs, for instance, legal and regulatory framework, the information environment, 
the state of financial sector infrastructure and others.  Thus, one needs to be mindful of 
these factors when interpreting the results. 
 
As a suggestion, since banks is a major source of SME financing, future research may 
consider the impact of SME lending on SME contribution to GDP. 
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